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MULTIPLE SECURITY DOMAIN MODEL OF A VEHICLE IN AN
AUTOMATED VEHICLE SYSTEM

by

UDAY GANESH KANTETI

A THESIS

Presented to the Graduate Faculty of the

MISSOURI UNIVERSITY OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree

MASTER OF SCIENCE

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Approved by

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ABSTRACT

This thesis focuses on the security of automated vehicle platoons. Specifically, it examines the vulnerabilities that occur via disruptions of the information flows among the different types of sensors, the communications network and the control unit in each vehicle of a platoon. Multiple security domain nondeducibility is employed to determine whether the system can detect attacks. The information flows among the various domains provide insights into the vulnerabilities that exist in the system by showing if an attacker's actions cannot be deduced. If nondeducibility is found to be true, then an attacker can create an undetectable attack. Defeating nondeducibility requires additional information sources, including invariants pertaining to vehicle platoon operation. A platoon is examined from the control unit perspective to determine if the vulnerabilities are associated with preventing situational awareness, which could lead to vehicle crashes.

Keywords: Automated vehicle platoons, multiple security domain nondeducibility

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
ABSTRACT	iii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS	iv
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS	vii
LIST OF TABLES	viii
NOMENCLATURE	ix
 SECTION	
1. INTRODUCTION.....	1
2. SYSTEM MODEL	4
3. RELATED WORK ON SECURITY.....	8
3.1. PRIVACY.....	8
3.2. INTEGRITY	9
3.3. AVAILABILITY	10
4. PROBLEM STATEMENT	14
4.1. WHEN THE CARS CONTAIN ONLY ONE INFORMATION PATH (NET- WORK OR SENSOR)	16
4.2. WHEN THE CARS CONTAIN BOTH THE NETWORK AND SENSOR INFORMATION PATH	18
4.3. WHEN THE CARS HAVE AN ADDITIONAL INVARIANT ADDED AS A SECURITY DOMAIN	22

4.4. PLATOON	24
4.4.1. Single Platoon	25
4.4.2. Multiple Platoon	28
4.4.3. Multiple Platoons With Lane Angle Detection	29
4.4.4. Attacker Is Able To Modify Three Information Paths	33
5. FUTURE WORK	37
6. CONCLUSION	38
BIBLIOGRAPHY	40
VITA.....	43

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

Figure	Page
1.1 A vehicle platoon.....	2
2.1 Information transfer	5
3.1 Security domains of information flow	13
4.1 Invariant model.....	20
4.2 InfoSourceValidator (<i>ISV</i>).....	25
4.3 Network vs invariant	26
4.4 Multiple platoons.....	26
4.5 Detecting the angle.....	30

LIST OF TABLES

Table	Page
4.1 Valuation function.....	15
4.2 State description.....	19
4.3 State description when invariant is added.....	27
4.4 MSDND analysis results for a single car.....	35
4.5 MSDND analysis results for platoon.....	35
4.6 MSDND analysis results for multiple platoons.....	35
4.7 MSDND analysis results for multiple platoons where three paths are compromised	36

NOMENCLATURE

SYMBOL	DESCRIPTION
s_x	A boolean state variable, x is true or false
W	The set of all possible worlds of the system
w	A world of interest
M	Model
SD	Security Domain
ϕ	A boolean statement that can be evaluated
V_x^i	A valuation function of boolean x in domain i
i	Invariant source

1. INTRODUCTION

Automated vehicle systems are likely to be the future of transportation. With the advent of VANETS (vehicular ad-hoc networks)[1] many vehicles are able to communicate through a wireless channel. The real time application of a vehicle platoon where 8-25 cars follow one another and mimic the actions performed by the vehicle in front of it is new but the concept of a vehicle platoon was introduced in PATH (Partners for Advanced Transit and Highways) project in 1986 [2] that demonstrated the benefits of a vehicle platoon. It was believed that the introduction of platoons would increase the capacity of the roads, reduce trip delays and limit energy consumption. The PATH program would also avoid accidents and breakdowns since more than 95% of accidents were caused by careless drivers and vehicle breakdowns [2].

People are often a little hesitant to trust the decision making of a driverless car. While cruise control has existed for some time, this only controls the speed but with the arrival of autonomous technology, other characteristics of a vehicle such as braking, maneuvering and acceleration can also be controlled. When the concept of a driverless vehicle is expanded to a vehicle platoon as shown in Figure 1.1, the information flow should be secure and any discrepancy in the distance or speed should be identified immediately. The goal of cyber-physical security is to figure out the cause of the discrepancy because once the source of the incorrect information is identified, appropriate steps can be taken to safeguard the infrastructure (i.e., to discard or repair). The information that is given out by the components of the vehicles needs to be protected.

Self-driving vehicles from Tesla and Google are already in the market and have been able to




Figure 1.1. A vehicle platoon

(From <https://static.dreamstime.com/t/car-line-art-vector-illustrations-48227977.jpg>)

successfully demonstrate these vehicles in real traffic. These vehicles are able to handle all the driving. These cars are well equipped to detect pedestrians, cyclists, vehicles, road work and more from a distance of up to two football fields in all directions. It is logical to assume that in the coming years we would see more of self-driving vehicles and communication between vehicles is a distinct possibility.

Self-driving autonomous vehicles utilize technologies like GPS, 360-degree camera systems, sensors, beacons and powerful onboard processing computers. This gives the attacker a variety of path choices to attack but our infrastructure utilizes these information paths in such a way that even if a few paths are compromised, the remaining would help us identify the compromised path/vehicle.

The attack would be undetectable if the model is non-deducible because the vehicle would not know that there is a component in the car that has been compromised. The main contribution of the thesis is to devise a cyber-physical platoon model where an attack would be deducible and if possible alert the vehicle about the compromised source. We are trying to create security domains in such a way that if an attack occurs in one domain, then

the compromised domain could be detected with the help of information paths from other domains. The presented work and its various case scenarios demonstrate the potential to detect security issues in a cyber-physical system.

The rest of the thesis is organized as follows Section 2 presents the system model. Section 3 gives the related work, Section 4 presents the problems, attempted solutions and the proofs associated with it. Section 5 provides direction for future work and Section 6 concludes this work.

2. SYSTEM MODEL

The following describes how the vehicle platoon works [3]:

1. The lead vehicle(LV) decides the movement of the platoon. Lead vehicle is defined as the vehicle in front of the platoon. The vehicles behind the LV follow it.
2. The vehicles in the platoon receive this information from the previous vehicle and maneuver it accordingly.
3. If the LV wants to slow down or take a turn, it indicates this in the beacon and the vehicles follow suit.
4. Each vehicle checks and compares the information it receives through the sensors and from the communication network. If the information is consistent, it proceeds otherwise it raises a flag.
5. Other vehicles check the flagged car information and then decide to either keep the car in the platoon or remove it.

When communication between autonomous vehicles comes to mind people think of VANETs (vehicular ad-hoc networks). Although there are many benefits of VANETs, they have a drawback when it comes to scalability since each vehicle in VANETs is connected to all other vehicles and there are n^2 connections required for n vehicles. Each vehicle in the single platoon model is connected directly to the vehicle ahead, behind and to the lead vehicle (since each vehicle mimics the lead vehicle) which reduces the number of

connections from n to 3. Each platoon has a lead vehicle and all the lead vehicles of the platoon are connected. In this way, all the vehicles stay connected and the scalability problem is reduced.




Figure 2.1. Information transfer

This cyber-physical system consists of a computer such as the control unit and a physical system, which in our case is the car. Information flows between different security domains. The security domain can be labeled as “secure” or “non secure”. Our model includes the following :

1. Communication network

Our model can use any wireless networking technology as its basis, the most prominent of which are short-range radio technologies like WLAN (either standard Wi-Fi and ZigBee). In addition, cellular technologies or LTE can be used. In the United States, the IEEE 1609 WAVE (Wireless Access in Vehicular Environments) protocol stack builds on IEEE 802.11p WLAN operating on seven reserved channels in the 5.9 GHz frequency band. The WAVE protocol stack is designed to provide multi-channel operation (even for vehicles equipped with only a single radio), security, and

lightweight application layer protocols. Within the IEEE Communications Society, there is a technical subcommittee on Vehicular Networks and Telematics Applications (VNTA). A control unit captures this information. Beacon messages are passed on this network

2. Sensors

Velodyne LiDAR sensors are designed for obstacle detection and navigation of autonomous ground vehicles and marine vessels. Its durability, 360 field of view and very high data rate makes this sensor ideal for the most demanding perception applications as well as 3D mobile data collection and mapping applications. The HDL-64E's innovative laser array enables navigation and mapping systems to observe more of their environment than any other LiDAR sensor. The information received from the LiDAR would be sent to the control unit. RADAR sensors are devices used in advanced cruise control systems that can direct a vehicle's accelerator and braking systems, controlling the distance between it and another vehicle. The radar sensors note vital information such as range, angle and Doppler velocity. This information is used to determine the driving situation and warn the driver in potentially dangerous events. If the driver does not take appropriate action in time and a crash is about to happen, advanced radar systems can take control of the vehicle to avoid the crash or lessen the accident's severity. This high level of safety functionality is maintained in bad weather and no light, when driving conditions are at their worst.

Our model is independent of the sensor type. We only deal with the information that the sensor gives, we assume both give us accurate readings.

3. Control Unit

This is the brain of the system and gives the vehicle directions. Based on the inputs it receives from various sources, the control unit makes decisions. If discrepancy in information path is detected, the control unit would alert other vehicles by sending special-purpose messages. Special-purpose messages are messages sent out to address specific issues.

4. Monitor

We will be using the invariant equation $\text{distance} = \text{speed} \star \text{time}(t)$ to make a calculation of where the vehicle might be at time t . An invariant is defined as a function, quantity, or property that remains unchanged when a specified transformation is applied. The assumption is that the car would have its own speed calculation mechanism like the speedometer and a clock that would give the time. At each instance, a monitor would be able to compute the distance information and send it to the control unit. The monitor uses a checker to evaluate each information source with another to see if they match. This will be further explained in detail in the case studies.

The messages (information regarding the speed and distance) are passed from the lead vehicle to the corresponding vehicles in the platoon in the form of beacons (messages that are transmitted in a network from one vehicle to another) as shown in Figure 2.1. Beacons contain information of the speed and distance of all the vehicles in front of the present vehicle. A control unit gathers information directly from sensors and also from the communication network that exist between the vehicles.

3. RELATED WORK ON SECURITY

Various security threats from this project arise such as integrity (attacker could change the information in a beacon), confidentiality (attacker could track the car's identity) and availability (attacker could jam the network used for communicating the distance and speed information). "Attacker" here is defined as someone/something that does not have authorization to access or modify the car or the components in the system but is able to modify it. The attacker could do the above attacks to demand money from the owner of a vehicle, to cause a traffic block or to cause a crash. Some of the devices such as the distance sensor or the camera, are exposed to the outside environment, so damage to these entities due to environmental or traffic conditions can cause the devices to malfunction. Many ideas were proposed to tackle the problem of security.

3.1. PRIVACY

Many works involved securing the entity itself. In [1], Ulrich Lang and Rudolf Schreiner have tried to use separate access control to prohibit change in the control statements of the car. They have divided each section on the control board and restricted the information flow based on the type of control it pertains to. They have only worked on preserving the privacy of the vehicle. They presented a list of security requirements to be enforced in ICSI (improved cooperative sensing for improved traffic efficiency), the protection of the ICSI system itself, the application data, and the user privacy. The privacy protection of vehicles has been worked on as shown in [4]. Here the idea of a virtual trip

lane (VTL) was used. By using VTL the location and speed reports can be regulated. Based on these reports, the estimated time of VTL_1 is calculated when the vehicle enters from VTL_1 to VTL_2 and compared to the actual arrival time in VTL_2 . They found that the idea of only releasing trajectory data within VTL zones helps protect privacy.

3.2. INTEGRITY

Work has also been done to secure the information by using encryption mechanisms as seen in [5], but that model was limited in that it only provided conditional privacy (i.e., only the entities involved know about the communication). Recently cyber attacks on the vehicles were reported. These were done on a Jeep on prior notice to the drivers [6]. They took control of the ECU(Engine Control Unit), which sends out command to components in the car. They were able to kill the brakes, steer the vehicle, and control the horn and parking lights of the car.

There have been many other famous attacks. These have been done via access directly to the computer's hardware or through a wireless channel. Some of the cases are discussed below. In terms of hardware, the main idea of any attacker is to get into the CAN¹ of the vehicle through which they would be able to control the car. The vulnerabilities of the CAN are discussed in [7]. CAN packets contain no authentication fields or even any source identifier fields, meaning that any component can indistinguishably send a packet to any other component. This means that any single compromised component can be used to

¹Controller Area Network-is a vehicle bus standard designed to allow micro-controllers and devices to communicate with each other in applications without a host computer

control all of the other components on that bus. The researchers suggested that by sending malicious data through broadcast from the infected CAN will make them take charge of the car. The researchers were able to spoof the data of speed.

The researchers in [7] have worked on wireless access which is discussed in [8]. Through the use of Bluetooth and reverse engineering they were able to gain access to the ECU. Once access is made, the attacker can make changes to the braking system, and modify the speed. Another recent attack was made on a Tesla S model by researchers from Keen Security Lab, they too were able to connect to the CAN of the vehicle wireless. The basic fault comes when the driver connects to a malicious WiFi hotspot nearby. The researchers in [9] were able to devise an alternate solution for message authentication by using ECDSA with omission techniques and TESLA++, but the problem of scalability still exists as each new vehicle has to be authenticated with every other vehicle in a group through an RSU (road side unit), although their work does reduce the authentication overhead when two groups would like to communicate. If the information is true, the vehicle is kept otherwise a special message is raised. The verification is performed by the ECU using the information from another vehicle.

3.3. AVAILABILITY

Blocking the availability of information is a serious problem in connected vehicles. Traditional techniques like beamforming (a technique of actively steering the beam of transmission and reception of a wireless communication system in such a way that useful signal reception is maximized while interfering signal reception is minimized), were used to avoid jamming attacks in the sensors [10]. A Sybil attack can be seen in connected

vehicles. A Sybil attack is one in which an attacker maliciously subverts the reputation system of a peer-to-peer network system by creating a large number of pseudonymous identities. Using these identities, the attacker can gain a disproportionately large influence on the functioning of the system. In [11] they have found an efficient way to detect this attack through methods that use less complex cryptography techniques and obtaining pseudonyms from RSU (road side units) at continuous intervals from a trusted source. Distinct RSUs that periodically collect reports from communicating vehicles regarding this neighborhood reduce the vulnerability.

In the long term, it is believed that the vehicles involved in the Sybil attack will give out similar information compared to the benign vehicles. The group of researchers in [12] tried to use a trust-based system to detect malicious vehicles. This was a very innovative approach where they used an iterative filtering algorithm to detect the malicious vehicles to address the problem of coalition. In their method, they could detect that vehicles which were trying to improve the trust rating of false vehicles. Another set of attacks that can be easily detected are denial of service (DOS) attacks. In [13] they take time intervals for listening on the channel and verifying if all the beacons have been received or not. If there is a beacon loss, then there should be at least two nodes involved in a collision within the same group, but to achieve this state they need to have an initialization phase. The outcome of the initialization phase is the sets of vehicle identifiers such as beacons from different sets never colliding with each other.

Attacks such as the one mentioned in [6], are difficult to detect and mitigate with only one car. The researchers in [4] used the estimated time traveled by each vehicle in each VTL_1 , but we here take the real time data for computation. Therefore, if an attacker were to

know the position of a vehicle in a virtual trip zone, the attacker would be able to track the movement of the vehicle in real time. Attackers in [7][8] were able to spoof data coming from a communication network and the beacon. Cryptography was used to secure the messages between vehicles in [5] and [9]. Using the strongest encryption method is a good solution, but there is an assumption in cryptography that keys are exchanged securely before initiation of communication. In real-time cases such as cars it is not possible to securely share while the vehicles are in motion. The DOS (denial of service) attacks mentioned in [10] and [13] are based on reducing interference and listening to the channel periodically, but the problems arise when there are hazardous weather conditions making it difficult to listen to the channel.

Multiple Security Domain Nondeducibility (MSDND):

Nondeducibility (ND) was introduced by Sutherland [14] in an attempt to model infrastructures to secure information in a partitioned model. The partitions are grouped into two or more sets. These sets are usually labeled as high and low with all information restricted to one side of the partition or the other. Information that could not be determined from the other side of the domain is said to be nondeducibility secure. However, the partition must be absolute and it must be simplistic. Overlapping security domains present severe difficulties for Sutherland's Nondeducibility, as do information flows, which cannot be evaluated because the model lacks the required valuation functions. Let V be the set of valuation functions such that $V_{s_x}^i(w)$ returns the value of state variable s_x as seen by an entity i in world w . For example, we have a control unit c in our model which gets the distance information from say sensors d_s , then $V_{d_s}^c(w)$ will return the value true if it gets the information of distance from the sensor otherwise the value will be false.

Definition 1 A system is MSDND secure if there exists some world with a pair of states where one must be true and the other false (exclusive OR), but an entity i has no valuation function for those states. An entity within the security domain SD^i , i cannot know which state is true and which is false [15].

$$MSDND(ES) = \exists w \in W \vdash \square [(s_x \vee s_y)] \wedge \sim (s_x \wedge s_y) \wedge [w \models (\nexists V_x^i(w) \wedge \nexists V_y^i(w))]$$

An equivalent formula is

$$MSDND(ES) = \exists w \in W \vdash \square [(s_x \oplus s_y)] \wedge [w \models (\nexists V_x^i(w) \wedge \nexists V_y^i(w))]$$

Where s_x and s_y are states, V_x^i and V_y^i are the valuation functions of x in domain i and y on domain i and w is a world.




Figure 3.1. Security domains of information flow

4. PROBLEM STATEMENT

It is possible to devise an attack like a STUXNET attack [16] where the attacker changes the values of speed and distance, but the model needs to be able to tell if this kind of attack (change in the information of the sensor or network) is MSDND. If the attack is MSDND then it is good for the attacker as the model would not know which component is malfunctioning. Therefore, the model should be designed to eliminate attacks that are MSDND secure.

Figure 3.1 shows how the security domains are divided and also the interaction between the car and the communication points. There is a control unit in the car that computes the movement of the car. If there is a discrepancy in the distance information sent by one of the paths to the control unit, then the control unit would know that there is something wrong.

Below are the set of entities c, s, n, ch that can be evaluated to determine the interactions between the car and the communication system. Here,

1. c : the control unit in the car (control unit gets the data and computes the movement accordingly) .
2. s : sensors (LiDAR) denoted by s that gives distance value $d(s)$.
3. n : communication network between the cars that gives network value $d(n)$.

Table 4.1. Valuation function

Valuation	Result
$V_c^c = s_0 \wedge T$	“true” \leftrightarrow Control unit is controlling the car
$V_{dn}^c = s_1 \wedge T$	“true” \leftrightarrow Control unit gets input from networks
$V_{ds}^c = s_2 \wedge T$	“true” \leftrightarrow Control unit gets input from sensors
$V_{ch}^c = s_3 \wedge T$	“true” \leftrightarrow Control unit gets result from checker

4. *ch*: this is a computational unit inside the control unit that checks if the information received from the information paths is true. In this case, we have three checkers: *ch*₁ (checks if $d(n)=d(s)$), *ch*₂ (checks if $d(s)=d(i)$) and *ch*₃ (checks if $d(i)=d(n)$), where $d(n)$, $d(s)$ and $d(i)$ are distance information received by the control unit from the network, sensor and invariant, respectively.

We also have $d(c)$, which is the distance that the control unit accepts based on information received from the paths. On any given state, the valuation functions will return the value of the corresponding state variables as seen by the entity in control c, s, n .

The control unit will be able to detect a compromised information path if the information it receives from the sensor is not equal to the communication network. In other words it uses the result of *ch*. If it is false then the control unit would know that one of the information paths is compromised.

There are two information paths as seen in Figure 1.1, sensors and networks. For the following case, the vehicle has only one information path either sensor or network that gives the distance between itself and the car in front of it. This case shows how having one information path can make the system MSDND secure and also not MSDND secure.

4.1. WHEN THE CARS CONTAIN ONLY ONE INFORMATION PATH (NETWORK OR SENSOR)

Case 1a: Let us assume that the cars are connected only through a network, n and the network is providing correct information under normal conditions, i.e., $d(n) = True$.

1. $w \models (\exists V_{d(n)}^c(w))$ Control unit receives distance information from network.

From the above statement,

$$MSDND(ES) = \exists w \in W: w \vdash \Box (d(n) \oplus \neg d(n)) \wedge [w \models (\exists V_{d(n)}^c(w) \wedge \nexists V_{\neg d(n)}^c(w))]$$

Hence, the system is not nondeducible secure to the control unit according to the definition since we have $\exists V_{d(n)}^c(w)$. In this case the goal of making the model non deducible secure is met.

Case 1b: Let us assume that the cars connected through a network, n receive incorrect information(i.e., $\neg d(n) = True$). This is possible if an attacker is able to get into the system.

1. $w \models (\nexists V_{\neg d(n)}^c(w))$ Control unit receives distance information from network.

From the above statement,

$$MSDND(ES) = \exists w \in W: w \vdash \Box (d(n) \oplus \neg d(n)) \wedge [w \models (\nexists V_{d(n)}^c(w) \wedge \nexists V_{\neg d(n)}^c(w))]$$

Hence, the system is nondeducible secure to the control unit according to the definition. In this case the goal of making the model non deducible secure is not met.

Case 1c: Let us assume that the cars are connected only through s where the sensor is providing correct information (i.e., $d(s) = True$) under normal conditions.

1. $w \models (\exists V_{d(s)}^c(w))$ Control unit receives distance information from sensor.

From the above statement

$$\text{MSDND (ES)} = \exists w \in W: w \vdash \square (d(s) \oplus \neg d(s)) \wedge [w \models (\exists V_{d(s)}^c(w) \wedge \nexists V_{\neg d(s)}^c(w))]$$

Hence, the system is not Nondeducible secure to the control unit according to the definition since we have $\exists V_{d(s)}^c(w)$. In this case the goal of making the model non deducible secure is met

Case 1d: Let us assume that the cars connected through s receive incorrect information (i.e., $\neg d(s) = \text{True}$). This is possible if the attacker is able to get into the system.

1. $w \models (\nexists V_{\neg d(s)}^c(w))$ Control unit receives distance information from sensor.

From the above statement

$$\text{MSDND (ES)} = \exists w \in W: w \vdash \square (d(s) \oplus \neg d(s)) \wedge [w \models (\nexists V_{d(s)}^c(w) \wedge \nexists V_{\neg d(s)}^c(w))]$$

Hence, the system is nondeducible secure to the control unit according to the definition. Similar to case 1b the goal is not met

Although making a model that is not Nondeducible secure is the goal, the control unit in cases 1b and 1d would believe the data and direct the vehicle. Thus, having no other information path to verify could be hazardous. So based on our initial observations we can conclude that having multiple information paths is an important criteria to make the model not Nondeducible secure.

4.2. WHEN THE CARS CONTAIN BOTH THE NETWORK AND SENSOR INFORMATION PATH

Now let us assume the cases where we have the sensor and communication network provide the distance information to the control unit. The control unit would receive the distance information and based on it would decide if the information provided is correct or not. The control unit would know that an information path is corrupted if there is a discrepancy in the information provided by the two paths.

Case 2a: If n is faulty: someone has compromised the system. The attacker is able to manipulate the information and thus wrong information is received by the control unit from the network. Here, $\neg d(n) = True$ and $d(s) = True$.

1. $w \models (\exists V_{d(s)}^c(w))$ Control unit receives information from the sensor
2. $w \models (\nexists V_{\neg d(n)}^c(w))$ Control unit receives information from network
3. $w \models (\exists V_{d(ch)}^c)$ Information received from sensor and network do not match

From 3, the control unit would know that an information path has been compromised.

By combining above statements 1 and 2 we get

$$\text{MSDND (ES)} = \exists w \in W: w \vdash \Box(\neg d(n) \oplus ch) \wedge [w \models (\exists V_{d(ch)}^c(w) \wedge \nexists V_{\neg d(ch)}^c(w))]$$

Hence, the system is not nondeducible to the control unit because the control unit can deduce that something is going wrong, but cannot determine exactly which information path. An extra information path is needed to indicate which path is responsible for the incorrect data being transmitted.

Table 4.2. State description

ϕ_i	state	description
ϕ_0	σ_0	Control unit is controlling the car
ϕ_1	σ_1	Control unit gets input from networks
ϕ_2	σ_2	Control unit gets input from sensors
ϕ_3	σ_3	Control unit gets input from <i>invariant_{dist}</i>
ϕ_4	σ_4	Control unit gets result from <i>ch₁</i>
ϕ_5	σ_5	Control unit gets result from <i>ch₂</i>
ϕ_6	σ_6	Control unit gets result from <i>ch₃</i>
S_u	<i>uncompromised</i> = T	<i>uncompromised</i> = $\phi_4 \wedge \phi_5 \wedge \phi_6$
S_h	<i>compromised</i> = T	<i>compromised</i> = $\neg\phi_4 \vee \neg\phi_5 \vee \neg\phi_6$

Case 2b: If s is faulty: someone has compromised the system. The attacker is able to manipulate the information, and hence wrong information is received by the control unit from network. Here $\neg d(s)=\text{True}$ and $d(n) = \text{True}$

1. $w \models (\nexists V_{\neg d(s)}^c(w))$ Control unit receives information from the sensor
2. $w \models (\exists V_{d(n)}^c(w))$ Control unit receives information from network
3. $w \models \exists V_{ch_1}$ Information received from sensor and network do not match.

From 3, the control unit would know that an information path has been compromised.

By combining above statements 1 and 2 we get,

$$\text{MSDND (ES)} = \exists w \in W: w \vdash \square (\neg d(s) \oplus ch) \wedge [w \models (\exists V_{d(ch)}^c(w) \wedge \nexists V_{\neg d(s)}^c(w))].$$

Therefore, the system is not nondeducible to the control unit because the control unit can deduce that something is going wrong, but cannot determine exactly which information path is responsible for the incorrect data being transmitted.

Now if we consider the other components in the car like the invariant, we can model the MSDND model as the following as shown in Figure 4.1:




Figure 4.1. Invariant model

Here, there are 3 information paths- sensors, networks, and invariant

1. c : the control unit in the car (the control unit gets the data and computes the movement accordingly)
2. Distance estimators: sensors (LiDAR) denoted by s that give the value of $d(s)$.
3. n : communication network n between the cars that gives the value of $d(n)$.
4. $invariant_{dist}(d(i))$: distance= $speed \star time$; Every car would have its own speedometer through which it can calculate the distance it has traveled in a period of time.
5. ch : this is a computational unit inside the control unit that checks if the information received from the information paths is true. In this case, we have three checkers: ch_1 (checks if $d(n)=d(s)$), ch_2 (checks if $d(s)=d(i)$) and ch_3 (checks if $d(i)=d(n)$), where $d(n)$, $d(s)$ and $d(i)$ are distance information received by control unit from the network, sensor and invariant, respectively.

Based on our model, the three sources providing distance information are the following:

$$d_{t2} = \begin{cases} \text{range calculated by LIDAR/RADAR} - d_{t1}(s) \\ \text{speed} * \text{time} - d_{t1}(i) \\ \text{distance calculated through network} - d_{t1}(n) \end{cases} \quad (4.1)$$

sensors vs invariant: We assume that that vehicles are driving at constant velocity. At time 1s let us say a sensor has given $d(s)$ as 5m and at that point of time the vehicle is at 30m/sec. Since there is no change of speed at time 5s in the vehicle then sensor should report $d(s)$ as 5m. If any other information is given, then we would know that the sensor has been compromised.

network vs invariant: The network periodically updates the information of speed as shown in Figure 4.3, location and other relevant information of the vehicle. Now if at time t_1 the network gives a certain location of the vehicle V_{i+1} and at t_2 the network gives a certain location of V_{i+1} Based on this information V_i can calculate the distance moved by V_{i+1} . It also has the speed it traveled during this time and can calculate the distance. If there is any discrepancy in information then we would know that the network has been compromised. The control unit would have the correct distance information if there exists a valuation function for any one of the ch_1, ch_2 or ch_3 .

4.3. WHEN THE CARS HAVE AN ADDITIONAL INVARIANT ADDED AS A SECURITY DOMAIN

Let us now add another information path (invariant) to the model. This additional information will help us in making the model not MSDND secure. The control unit would also have the correct distance information if there exists a valuation function for any one of the ch_1, ch_2 or ch_3 and in this way can indicate which path is compromised.

Case 3a: n is faulty ,i.e., $\neg d(n) = True$:

1. $w \models (\nexists V_{\neg d(n)}^c(w))$ Control unit receives information from the network.
2. $w \models (\exists V_{d(s)}^c(w))$ Control unit receives information from the distance estimators.
3. $w \models (\exists V_{d(i)}^c(w))$ Control unit receives information from *invariant_{dist}*.
4. $w \models \nexists V_{ch_1}^c$.
5. $w \models \exists V_{ch_2}^c$.
6. $w \models \nexists V_{ch_3}^c$.

From 5 we get

7. $w \models \exists V_{d(c)}^c(w)$.

$$\text{MSDND (ES)} = \exists w \in W: w \vdash \Box(\neg d(n) \oplus ch_2) \wedge [w \models (\exists V_{d(ch_2)}^c(w) \wedge \nexists V_{\neg d(ch_2)}^c(w))]$$

Therefore, it is not nondeducible secure because the control unit can deduce that something is going wrong and determine that the network is responsible for the incorrect data being transmitted.

Case 3b: Let us now consider that the sensor is faulty. The control unit receives incorrect information from the sensor, s is faulty, i.e., $\neg d(s) = True$.

1. $w \models (\exists V_{d(n)}^c(w))$ Control unit receives information from the network.
2. $w \models (\nexists V_{-d(s)}^c(w))$ Control unit receives information from the distance estimators.
3. $w \models (\exists V_{d(i)}^c(w))$ Control unit receives information from the *invariant_{dist}*.
4. $w \models \nexists V_{ch_1}^c$.
5. $w \models \nexists V_{ch_2}^c$.
6. $w \models \exists V_{ch_3}^c$.

$$\text{MSDND (ES)} = \exists w \in W: w \vdash \Box(\neg d(s) \oplus ch_3 \wedge [w \models (\exists V_{d(ch_3)}^c(w) \wedge \nexists V_{-d(s)}^c(w))])$$

Therefore it is not nondeducible secure because the control unit can deduce that something is going wrong and determine that distance estimators are responsible for the incorrect data being transmitted.

We have assumed that the invariant is always true and that the information about the speed is unaltered, but in [6] they can also change the information received to the control unit. If such a case arises then we would have the other two components, sensor and network, correctly give us the information as shown in case 3c.

Case 3c: i is faulty, i.e., $\neg d(i) = True$.

1. $w \models (\exists V_{d(n)}^c(w))$ Control unit receives information from the network.
2. $w \models (\exists V_{-d(s)}^c(w))$ Control unit receives information from the distance estimators.
3. $w \models (\nexists V_{d(i)}^c(w))$ Control unit receives information from the *invariant_{dist}*.
4. $w \models \exists V_{ch_1}^c$.

$$5. w \models \nexists V_{ch_2}^c.$$

$$6. w \models \nexists V_{ch_3}^c.$$

$$\text{MSDND (ES)} = \exists w \in W: w \vdash \Box(\neg d(i) \oplus ch_1 \wedge [w \models (\exists V_{d(ch_1)}^c(w) \wedge \nexists V_{\neg d(i)}^c(w))])$$

Therefore it is not nondeducible secure because the control unit can deduce that something is going wrong and determine that invariance is responsible for the incorrect data being transmitted.

4.4. PLATOON

Let us consider we have different cars in a platoon and also that, there are various platoons in a vehicle as seen in Figure 4.4. Now the following are sources of information:

1. *s*: sensors (LiDAR) that give distance value $d(s)$.
2. *n*: communication network between the cars that gives network value $d(n)$.
3. *Invariant*₁: distance=speed★time which gives the value of $d(invariant_i)$; every car would have its own speedometer through which it could calculate the distance it has traveled in a period of time
4. *InfoSourceValidator (ISV)*: This is similar to an array data type that stores the True/False result after comparing the distance reported by each information source with another as shown in Figure 4.2. If there are more true values reported than false, then the valuation function for ISV exists.

5. *invariant₂*- As shown in Figure 4.4, communication can be made between two platoons. In this case, the A, B and P form an information path, since each car is equipped with the proximity sensors. V_P has information of $\{x, y\}$. Similarly, V_A has information of $\{x, z_A\}$ and V_B has information of $\{y, z_B\}$. Now we would send back this information to V_A and V_B and V_A will have information of $\{x, z_A, z_B\}$. If z_A is not equal to z_B , then no valuation function exists for *invariant₂*; otherwise, it exists.

6. *beacon_i*: it gives information of *speed_i* and *velocity_i* of vehicle *i* in the platoon.

ch ₁	d(s)=d(invariant ₁)
ch ₂	d(s)=d(n)
ch ₃	d(s)=d(invariant ₂)
ch ₄	d(s)=d(beacon ₁)
ch ₅	d(n)=d(invariant ₂)
ch ₆	d(n)=d(beacon ₁)
.	.
.	.
.	.
.	.
ch _y	d(y)=d(x)

Figure 4.2. InfoSourceValidator (*ISV*) follows an enumeration of checking sources against both other sources and invariants combining multiple source

4.4.1. Single Platoon. Let us assume that no other platoon exists nearby and there are multiple vehicles in a single platoon. We would now have communication from other cars. The cars would communicate with each other using a beacon. The beacon would now




Figure 4.3. Network vs invariant

The vehicles can calculate the distance covered in $t_1 - t_2$ interval using the latitude(lat) and longitude (lon) coordinates as well as by using the equation distance= speed*time




Figure 4.4. Multiple platoons

be another information path to the control unit and would help in detecting vulnerable path.

Case 4: Let us see if our model will be able to detect if a car is giving wrong information.

The beacon is giving incorrect information (i.e., \neg beacon=True).

Table 4.3. State description when invariant is added

ϕ_i	state	description
ϕ_0	σ_0	Control unit is controlling the car
ϕ_1	σ_1	Control unit accepts command from networks
ϕ_2	σ_2	Control unit accepts command from sensors
ϕ_3	σ_3	Control unit accepts command from <i>invariant</i> ₁
ϕ_4	σ_4	Control unit accepts command from beacon
ϕ_5	σ_5	Control unit accepts command from <i>invariant</i> ₂
ϕ_6	σ_5	Control unit gets result from <i>ISV</i>

1. $w \models (\exists V_{d(n)}^c)$ Control unit accepts command from network.
2. $w \models (\exists V_{d(s)}^c)$ Control unit accepts command from sensors.
3. $w \models (\exists V_{invariant_1}^c)$ Control unit receives information from *invariant*₁.
4. $w \models (\nexists V_{beacon_i}^c)$ Control unit receives information from beacon.

From 1, 2, 3 we get

5. $w \models \exists V_{ISV}^c$.

From 5 we get,

6. $w \models \exists V_{d(c)}^c(w)$

$$\text{MSDND (ES)} = \exists w \in \mathbf{W}: w \vdash \Box(\neg beacon_i \oplus ISV) \wedge [w \models (\exists V_{d(c)}^c(w) \wedge \nexists V_{\neg d(c)}^c(w))]$$

Therefore, it is not nondeducible secure because the control unit can deduce that something is going wrong and determine that the *beacon*_i is responsible for the incorrect data being transmitted. In this way, we would be able to detect if a vehicle in the platoon has been compromised.

Let us now look at the case where there are multiple platoons as shown in Figure 4.4. Here we have an information path from the adjacent platoons. These information paths help us in detecting an incorrect data path if more than one information path is compromised.

4.4.2. Multiple Platoon. As shown in Figure 4.4 let us consider that there are more than one platoon.

Case 5a: There are different platoons, and each platoon has some number of vehicles and $\neg beacon_i = True$.

1. $w \models (\exists V_{d(n)}^c)$ Control unit accepts command from network.
2. $w \models (\exists V_{d(s)}^c)$ Control unit accepts command from sensors.
3. $w \models (\exists V_{invariant_1}^c)$ Control unit receives information from *invariant*₁.
4. $w \models (\nexists V_{beacon_i}^c)$ Control unit accepts information from beacon.
5. $w \models (\exists V_{invariant_2}^c)$ Control unit receives information from *invariant*₂.

From 1, 2, 3, 5 we get

6. $w \models \exists V_{d(c)}^c(w)$

$$MSDND(ES) = \exists w \in W: w \vdash \square (\neg beacon_i \oplus invariant_2) \wedge [w \models (\exists V_{d(c)}^c(w) \wedge \nexists V_{\neg d(c)}^c(w))]$$

Therefore, it is not nondeducible secure because the control unit can deduce that something is going wrong and determine that the *beacon*_i is responsible for the incorrect data being transmitted.

Case 5b: Let us consider that there are two paths that are compromised. For this case let us assume that the sensor ($\neg d(s) = true$) and the beacon ($\neg beacon_i = True$) are compromised.

1. $w \models (\exists V_{d(n)}^c)$ Control unit accepts command from network.
2. $w \models (\nexists V_{d(s)}^c)$ Control unit accepts command from sensors.
3. $w \models (\exists V_{invariant_1}^c)$ Control unit receives information from $invariant_1$.
4. $w \models (\nexists V_{beacon_i}^c)$ Control unit accepts information from beacon.
5. $w \models (\exists V_{invariant_2}^c)$ Control unit receives information from $invariant_2$.

From 1, 3, 5 we get

$$6. w \models \exists V_{d(c)}^c(w)$$

$$MSDND(ES) = \exists w \in W: w \vdash \square (\neg beacon_i \oplus invariant_2) \wedge [w \models (\exists V_{d(c)}^c(w) \wedge \nexists V_{\neg d(c)}^c(w))]$$

$$MSDND(ES) = \exists w \in W: w \vdash \square (\neg d(s) \oplus invariant_2) \wedge [w \models (\exists V_{d(c)}^c(w) \wedge \nexists V_{\neg d(c)}^c(w))]$$

Therefore, it is not nondeducible secure because the valuation function $\exists V_{d(c)}^c(w)$ exists.

In this way, we would be able to use the information from other platoons. This study tries to consider as many information paths as possible to detect the compromised information path. Platoons are considered to detect if a vehicle has been compromised because Case 4 was able to detect the compromised vehicle without a platoon, but if there are other sources that are compromised, then having this additional source could be helpful in detecting an attack.

4.4.3. Multiple Platoons With Lane Angle Detection. Now, let us assume that the model has an additional feature of being able to calculate the angle at which each vehicle is located. We can use techniques as discussed in [17]. These help in obtaining the angle

information and we can use the equation $c^2 = a^2 + b^2 - 2ab\cos\theta$.

From Figure 4.5:

$$\text{invariant}_{ang}(\theta) = \theta_1 + \theta_2 \quad (4.2)$$

$$c^2 = a^2 + b^2 - 2ab\cos\theta \quad (4.3)$$




Figure 4.5. Detecting the angle

As shown in Figure 4.5, V_P can calculate the distance between V_A and V_Q using the above information. By using this information vehicle V_P can verify against the information sent to it by V_A and V_Q and by the information stored in the communication network.

Case 5c: Let us assume that the information sent out by vehicle V_Q is faulty (i.e., $\neg \text{beacon}_{V_Q} = \text{True}$)

1. $w \models (\exists V_{invariant_{ang_A}}^c)$ Control unit of vehicle V_P receives the angle information of vehicle V_A .

2. $w \models (\exists V_{invariant_{ang_Q}}^c)$ Control unit of vehicle V_P receives the angle information of vehicle V_Q .

3. $w \models (\exists V_{d(s)_A}^c)$ Control unit receives distance information of vehicle V_A .

4. $w \models (\exists V_{d(s)_Q}^c)$ Control unit receives distance information of vehicle V_Q .

5. $w \models (\nexists V_{beacon_{V_Q}}^c)$ Control unit receives distance information of $beacon_{V_Q}$.

From 1, 2, 3, 4

6. $w \models \exists V_{invariant_{ang}}^c(w)$

From 6

7. $w \models \exists V_{d(c)}^c(w)$

$$MSDND(ES) = \exists w \in \mathcal{W}: w \vdash \square (\neg beacon_{V_Q} \oplus invariant_{ang}) \wedge [w \models (\exists V_{d(c)}^c(w) \wedge \nexists V_{\neg d(c)}^c(w))]$$

Case 5d: Let us assume that there is a fault in the communication network, i.e., $\neg d(n) =$

True

1. $w \models (\exists V_{invariant_{ang_A}}^c)$ Control unit of vehicle V_P receives the angle information of vehicle V_A .

2. $w \models (\exists V_{invariant_{ang_Q}}^c)$ Control unit of vehicle V_P receives the angle information of vehicle V_Q .

3. $w \models (\exists V_{d(s)_A}^c)$ Control unit receives distance information of vehicle V_A .

4. $w \models (\exists V_{d(s)_Q}^c)$ Control unit receives distance information of vehicle V_Q .

5. $w \models (\nexists V_{d(n)Q}^c)$ Control unit receives distance information of vehicle V_Q from network.

From 1, 2, 3, 4

6. $w \models \exists V_{invariant_{ang}}^c(w)$

From 6

7. $w \models \exists V_{d(c)}^c(w)$

$$MSDND(ES) = \exists w \in W: w \vdash \square (\neg V_{d(n)Q}^c \oplus invariant_{ang}) \wedge [w \models (\exists V_{d(c)}^c(w) \wedge \nexists V_{-d(c)}^c(w))]$$

Therefore, it is not nondeducible secure because the control unit can deduce that something is going wrong and determine that the $V_{d(n)Q}^c$ is responsible for the incorrect data being transmitted.

The total number of information paths in Figure 4.5 is six. These are

1. Sensor
2. Network
3. *beacon_i*
4. *invariant₁* which computes the distance travelled by the vehicle using *distance = speed * time*
5. *invariant₂* which uses the distance sensors of the vehicles nearby as seen in Figure 4.4.
6. *invariant₃* which uses the angle between vehicles to compute the distance as seen in Figure 4.5

We have seen cases where the attacker is able to modify less than half the number of information paths.

4.4.4. Attacker Is Able To Modify Three Information Paths. Let us now look at cases where the attacker is able to manipulate three information paths. Since this attack compromises three information paths, two case scenarios arise.

1. Attacker can change the value of these three paths to the same incorrect information (easy to detect as shown in **Case 6a**)
2. Attacker can change the value of these three paths (difficult to detect as shown in **Case 6b**)

For the following two cases we can consider any three paths to be compromised. Let us name the compromised information paths as $compinfo_1$, $compinfo_2$, $compinfo_3$ and the three correct information paths as $path_1$, $path_2$, $path_3$.

Case 6a: Let us assume that the three compromised paths have different values.

1. $w \models (\exists V_{path_1}^c)$ Control unit accepts information from path 1.
2. $w \models (\exists V_{path_2}^c)$ Control unit accepts information from path 2.
3. $w \models (\exists V_{path_3}^c)$ Control unit accepts information from path 3.
4. $w \models (\nexists V_{compinfo_1}^c)$ Control unit accepts information from compromised information path 1
5. $w \models (\nexists V_{compinfo_2}^c)$ Control unit accepts information from compromised information path 2

6. $w \models (\nexists V_{compinfo_3}^c)$ Control unit accepts information from compromised information path 3

From 1, 2, 3

7. $w \models \exists V_{d(c)}^c(w)$

MSDND (ES) = $\exists w \in W: w \vdash \square (d(c) \oplus \neg d(c)) \wedge [w \models (\exists V_{d(c)}^c(w) \wedge \nexists V_{\neg d(c)}^c(w))]$

Therefore, it is not Nondeducible secure because the control unit can deduce that something is going wrong and can also determine the information path responsible for the attack.

Case 6b: Let us assume that the three compromised paths have similar values.

1. $w \models (\exists V_{path_1}^c)$ Control unit accepts information from path 1.

2. $w \models (\exists V_{path_2}^c)$ Control unit accepts information from path 2.

3. $w \models (\exists V_{path_3}^c)$ Control unit accepts information from path 3.

4. $w \models (\nexists V_{compinfo_1}^c)$ Control unit accepts information from compromised information path 1

5. $w \models (\nexists V_{compinfo_2}^c)$ Control unit accepts information from compromised information path 2

6. $w \models (\nexists V_{compinfo_3}^c)$ Control unit accepts information from compromised information path 3

From 1, 2, 3

Table 4.4. MSDND analysis results for a single car

Case	Information Path	MSDND	Vehicle Status
1a	$d(n)$ is not compromised	No	Secure
1b	$d(n)$ is compromised	Yes	Not Secure
1c	$d(s)$ is not compromised	No	Secure
1d	$d(s)$ is compromised	Yes	Not Secure
2a	$d(n)$ is compromised	No	Secure
2b	$d(s)$ is compromised	No	Secure
3a	$d(n)$ is compromised	No	Secure
3b	$d(s)$ is compromised	No	Secure
3c	$d(i)$ is compromised	No	Secure

Table 4.5. MSDND analysis results for platoon

Case	Information Path	MSDND	Vehicle Status
4	$beacon_i$ is compromised	No	Secure
5a	$beacon_i$ is compromised	No	Secure
5b	$d(s)$ is compromised	No	Secure

Table 4.6. MSDND analysis results for multiple platoons

Case	Information Path	MSDND	Vehicle Status
5c	$beacon_i$ is compromised	No	Secure
5b	$d(n)$ is compromised	No	Secure

$$7. w \models \exists V_{d(c)_1}^c(w)$$

From 4, 5, 6

$$8. w \models \exists V_{d(c)_2}^c(w)$$

$$\text{MSDND (ES)} = \exists w \in W: w \vdash \square (d(c)_1 \oplus \neg d(c)_1) \wedge [w \models (\exists V_{d(c)_1}^c(w) \wedge \nexists V_{\neg d(c)_1}^c(w))]$$

$$\text{MSDND (ES)} = \exists w \in W: w \vdash \square (d(c)_2 \oplus \neg d(c)_2) \wedge [w \models (\exists V_{d(c)_2}^c(w) \wedge \nexists V_{\neg d(c)_2}^c(w))]$$

Therefore, it is not nondeducible secure because the control unit can deduce that something is going wrong, but cannot decide which set of information paths are compromised.

Table 4.7. MSDND analysis results for multiple platoons where three paths are compromised

Case	Information Path	MSDND	Vehicle Status
6a	Compromised paths giving different values	No	Secure
6b	Compromised paths giving same values	No	Secure

5. FUTURE WORK

The main focus of this thesis is on securing the connected vehicles and platoons of connected vehicles. Minimizing the number of assumptions would be our first step ahead. We also need to handle cases where more than half of the information sources are compromised. We will try looking into cases where two sets of information sources give the same set of incorrect information. There are many scenarios to be considered, such as: lane changing, platoon joining and platoon split. There is currently no technology to simulate them in a real scenario: We can only look at case scenarios and validate if the mathematical model would work.

6. CONCLUSION

MSDND is useful to model attacks where the goal is to hide critical information from an attacker rather than to steal information. MSDND secure is bad for the system and good for the attacker because information can be hidden by making it impossible to evaluate the desired question or the actual valuation function can be falsified to produce an invalid valuation, thus making the information MSDND secure and undetectable.

A model that has fewer number of states where MSDND secure is possible is a good cyber-physical system. In our model, most of the cases are not MSDND secure which makes our CPS a good model. We can also observe that if we have more information paths such as the invariant and beacon, detecting an attack is easy.

As we have seen, the invariant plays an important role when the regular information paths such as sensors, networks and beacon are compromised. We have three invariant equations:

1. $distance = speed * time$
2. $c = a^2 + b^2 + abCos\theta$
3. $invariant_2$ as discussed in section 4.

We have also shown how the model is efficient in various scenarios and how this model handles the various security threats as discussed in section 3. The attacker now has to corrupt multiple information paths to compromise the system but then too we have shown a case where other information paths can be used to indicate which path is compromised.

No system is 100 percent secure and in this research work, the model fails if we have more than $n/2$ compromised paths where n is the total number of information paths. We have also assumed that the invariant is always true but for some models the invariant equation may have variables that are computed based on components of the model. We have tried to make a model that is difficult to attack and tried to develop a security model in such a way that it provides more security and resilience against attackers.

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